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ETHIOPIA MAPS PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

By G. L. STEER

Wireless to The New York Times

Addis Ababa, Aug. 29

The Ethiopian general staff is making its preparations in the expectation that the first Italian attack will come from the north, with Adowa as the objective—a direct attack being covered by flank action through the Takkaze Valley and in Northeastern Walkait. Here the Emperor and Ras Seyyum, his commander in the Tigré district, are agreed to retire strategically before the Italians. But if the Italian aim is to conquer the whole country with a view to establishing a protectorate, simultaneous attacks from the east and south must be guarded against.

In the east 40,000 Italian troops are reported to have been concentrated at Assab, where they face the dim Wallo mountains and menace Dessie, the Crown Prince's province. Assab is also within air range of the two towns of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa and Harrar.

In the south Italy has a choice of routes—an advance upon Harrar, between Walwal and Fort Damot, or a slower movement up the Webbe Shibeli, or else a march from Dolo into the rich, lovely Arussi Galla country.

Air Base Suspected

Assab, it is reported, is more heavily fortified than any other base in Italian East Africa. This is informative, for desolate Assab, whose single road into the interior has already caused some dispute between Italian and Ethiopian engineers, lies fenced between sixty miles of the fierce Danakil waste.

With so many troops at Assab, why should the base be so heavily fortified? The Ethiopians think it is only because there is something fragile that Italy must protect behind the desert—that is to say, aircraft, whose ground organization is highly vulnerable but whose targets, Addis Ababa, Harrar and the Jibuti railway, cannot be threatened more nearly from any other Italian possession.

If the Italians make a land attack across the desert the Ethiopians feel their supply lines will be so elongated and attenuated that guerrilla forces from Dessie and Harrar, scissoring the communications, can cut the nerves of any real invasion. It is an air attack that the Ethiopians fear. For that reason the Dessie forces have received the same orders as the armies of the north and northwest; never to mass, always to scatter by day and assemble to attack at night.

The Ethiopian general staff believes that if it can tie up enough Italian troops in Northern Ethiopia and Danakil it can spare enough of its own soldiers for a counter-attack in the south. General Graziani commands what is believed to be an inadequate force there, and an Italian defeat on the Somaliland front, caused by Ethiopian infiltration and tribal rebellion, might, it is thought here, ruin Italy's military prestige and finish the war.

In the Ethiopian view, at any rate, that is the only way to finish the war quickly. Even if unsuccessful, it does not leave Italy's task of conquest in the central mountain massif of Amhara and Gojjam any easier, as an unsuccessful Ethiopian offensive followed by disintegration in Tigré, might well do.

How could a really damaging campaign of this kind be fought on the Italo-Somaliland frontier? First, by glueing the Italian forces to Eritrea and encouraging them to extend their communications with their flying columns in the Tigré uplands so they cannot spare men for a drive on Harrar or Arussi Galla across Ogaden.

At the moment there are probably no more than 60,000 men in Somaliland, although this calculation takes no account of the latest mobilizations of Italy which may be bound for the new port of Bender Kassim rather than for Massawa. If Italian troops in Somaliland remain about 60,000, the Ethiopians who recall General Graziani's reputation as a careful fighter, believe he will not try a sudden, swift attack on Harrar across the waterless and trackless Ogaden. He will advance gradually and finally his front will become too long to hold.



AT THE SHORES OF A LAKE

Then will come the Ethiopians' chance to slip in and destroy or win over the native Somali irregulars that Italy is using on the Somaliland front. The fact of an overwhelming proportion of native to white troops, necessitated by the malarial heat of Ogaden, gives the Ethiopians hope and partly explains the Emperor's visit to Jijiga four months ago.

If the native irregulars can be crumpled up the Somaliland frontier is open to any determined force. Once the Somali tribes feel that victory is tilting to the Ethiopian side their color and the injuries they are said to have received in the past year may result in the colony's exploding in revolt. Such is the general Ethiopian idea of a campaign in the south.

Ogaden, with its weary miles of thick, dust-laden camel trails, its heats and fevers, its brackish wells and flat, featureless ground and its nomad tribes, always has been distasteful to the Ethiopian highlander. He can perfectly well fight a campaign in Ogaden, as he showed during the 1903 season against the Mullah, when an Ethiopian force spent some months in Ogaden and gained

two signal victories over the Dervishes.

Southern Garrisons

But the Ethiopian hates to garrison or administer Ogaden, and even now his advanced headquarters are no further south than Daggah Bur. At Gerlogubi near the large Italian advanced post at Wardair there are not over 1,000, while Ado, the Ethiopian companion post north of the neutral zone, has a wretched, green water supply and is occupied by only 150.

The chief road northward used by Ethiopian motor trucks runs due west of Gerlogubi to Gorahai, then follows the Fafan River to Sasa Baneh. It is well maintained and speedily traversed. There is an alternative but less satisfactory route direct from Harradigit to Gerlogubi, and in case of war the Emperor may use the track blazed by the boundary and grazing commissions along the British Somaliland frontier, thus laying his left flank along British territory. But in the south, as in the north, the Emperor will wait for the Italians to make the first move, and it is the Italian position in Somaliland that tells more secrets now.

Since the rains broke in the interior and the monsoon opened at Mogadiscio, that port—dangerous at best—has been unemployable. For this reason, and in order to expedite the transport of troops from the north, the Italians have developed a new port at Bender Kassim on the Gulf of Aden. From Bander Kassim and for 350 miles along the British Somaliland frontier Italian troops and workmen have driven a great road to Mogadiscio.

Tribal Troubles

From the new road there are several radial routes toward Walwal and Wardair, but at present they are of doubtful value. Late information suggests that Italian relations with the tribes behind Walwal and Wardair are becoming difficult and may be really tense when the rains are over.

Walwal, with its hundreds of brackish pits, and Wardair, too, with its quota of Somali water, always have been the chief reservoirs for the Somali herds in this dry camel country. But it is reported that the Italian troops have swallowed up the wells in the past ten months to the detriment of the tribes. What will happen in the dry season if an advance opens on Harrar and every Ogaden well is occupied by Italian troops to assure a continual water supply?

Perhaps, think the Ethiopians, tribal discontent will give the stimulus required to start a great movement. At any rate, the Ethiopians hope to turn tribal grievances to good account when the Italian front is extended toward Harrar and is penetrable over the grasslands to the west of the Webbe Shebell.

The New York Times, Sept. 1, 1935

ADOWA: THE ITALIAN DISASTER OF 1896

Disputes arose between Italy and Abyssinia in 1895, after the establishment of the Italian colony of Eritrea on the shores of the Red Sea; and, in March, General Baratieri undertook the conquest of Tigré, the northern province of Abyssinia. At first he met with success; but in December he pushed a detachment as far south as Amba Alagi, and it was almost annihilated. Thereafter Baratieri's tactics were indecisive and the Government decided to supersede him. Meanwhile, anxious to win some success before the relieving general arrived, Baratieri attacked, in a weak position, at Adowa. The rout of the Italians was complete. They lost 4600 white troops and nearly 3000 native soldiers killed and wounded, while between 2500 and 3000 prisoners were taken by the enemy. The Abyssinian losses were about 10,000. Signor Mussolini was reported to have said recently: "Remember Italy has always defeated the black races. Only one battle turned against us—at Adowa. That was due simply to the overwhelming superiority in numbers of the enemy, when four thousand Italians had to fight against one hundred thousand Abyssinians."

The Illustrated London News

The Suez Canal and Its ★ ★ ★ ★ International Status

The free navigation of the Suez Canal[1] was guaranteed by the Convention between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and Turkey, respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, signed at Constantinople on Oct. 29, 1888. The text of this Convention is given in Volume 79 of British and Foreign State Papers, page 18.

The essence of the Convention is contained in the first of its seventeen articles, which lays down that:

The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to all merchant or war vessels without flag discrimination.

Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree in no way to prevent the free use of the Canal in time of war as in time of peace.

The Canal shall never be used for the exercise of the right of blockade.

The provisions of the other relevant Articles are as follows:

ARTICLE IV.—The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage, even to the ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article I of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of three marine miles from those ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers.

Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictual or take in stores in the Canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may be strictly necessary. The transit of the aforesaid vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay, in accordance with the Regulations in force, and without any other intermission than that resulting from the necessities of the service.

Their stay at Port Said and in the roadstead of Suez shall not exceed twenty-four hours, except in the case of distress. In such case they shall be bound to leave as soon as possible. An interval of twenty-four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship belonging to the hostile Power.

ARTICLE V.—In time of war belligerent Powers shall not disembark nor embark within the Canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions, or materials of war. But in case of an accidental hindrance in the Canal, men may be embarked or disembarked at the ports of access by detachments not exceeding 1000 men, with a corresponding amount of war material.

ARTICLE IX.—The Egyptian Government shall, within the limits of its powers resulting from the Firmans, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty, take the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the said Treaty.

In case the Egyptian Government should not have sufficient means at its disposal, it shall call upon the Imperial Ottoman Government, which shall take the necessary measures to respond to such appeal; shall give notice thereof to the Signatory Powers[2] of the Declaration of London of the 17th March, 1885; and shall, if necessary, concert with them on the subject.

The provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which shall be taken in virtue of the present Article.

ARTICLE X.—Similarly, the provisions of Articles IV, V, VII, and VIII shall not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order.

In case His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, or His Highness the Khedive, should find it necessary to avail themselves of the exceptions for which this Article provides, the Signatory Powers of the Declaration of London shall be notified thereof by the Imperial Ottoman Government. . . .

ARTICLE XI.—The measures which shall be taken in the cases provided for by Articles IX and X of the present Treaty shall not interfere with the free use of the Canal. In the same cases, the erection of permanent fortifications contrary to the provisions of Article VIII is prohibited.

Ratifications of the Convention were deposited in December, 1888. Great Britain, however, withheld ratification as her signature had been subject to the reservation that it was not to become effective "in view of the transitional state of Egypt at the time" during the British occupation. In accordance with the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 the British Government agreed to give effect to the Convention on condition that the provision of Article VIII concerning its annual supervision by the agents of the signatory Powers in Egypt remained in abeyance.

The question of closing the Suez Canal, in the hypothetical case of Italy being declared an aggressor by the League, has been raised in the House of Commons and widely discussed. Thus an examination of the pro-

visions of the Convention and the legal position with regard to the execution of such a decision is not out of place.

Article I lays down unequivocally that the Canal shall always be free and open to vessels of all kinds and of every flag, and the Contracting Parties undertake not to interfere with this freedom. Articles IV, V, and VI contain the rules to be applied to the vessels of belligerents in the event of war.

To this freedom there is one reservation. As the Canal runs through territory lying within the jurisdiction of a sovereign State it is natural that the right of that State to take legitimate action in self-defence should be reserved. Articles IX and X allocate to the Egyptian Government the task of insuring the execution of the Treaty and the right to secure by its own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order. While Article XI states that measures under the two preceding Articles shall not interfere with the free use of the Canal, the view has always been taken in Great Britain that the obligation to insure the safety of the Canal is paramount.

The provisions of the Convention are, therefore, clear; subject only to the exercise of the right of legitimate self-defence and to action to insure the safety of the Canal, there can be no restriction, provided that the rules are observed, on the free use of the Canal.

On two occasions in the past the Canal has been closed, and on a third the question of free use was raised.

The first was in 1882 (and therefore before the signature of the Convention) when, during the revolt of Arabi Pasha against the Khedive of Egypt, the safety of the Canal was thought to be imperilled. Before the battle of Telel-Kebir British troops under Sir Garnet Wolseley were landed at Suez and Port Said, and British ships were stationed at the latter. For three days the Canal was in British hands and ships in the Canal or entering it were stopped. This action was carried out under a decree of the Khedive, dated August 15, 1882, which recognised "the military occupation charged to re-establish order in Egypt, and authorised them to occupy all the ports necessary." The action of British troops was, therefore, undertaken for the benefit of and at the invitation of the territorial Power. The incident, however, raised the question of free use and gave rise to certain negotiations, which resulted in the conclusion of the Convention of 1888.

During the Spanish-American war of 1898 the attempt of the Spanish Fleet to coal at Suez on its way through the Canal was frustrated by the Canal authorities in accordance with the provisions of Article IV of the Convention.

The third occasion on which the Canal was closed was during the Great War, when free access and transit were stopped for a short period during which Egyptian territory and the safety of the Canal were actually endangered by the advance of the Turkish forces. During the rest of the war the freedom of the Canal was maintained. Certain enemy ships found themselves or took refuge in the Canal when war broke out; they were offered a free pass, but when they refused to accept it or sought to make use of the Canal merely as a place of refuge, they were conducted outside territorial waters. During the war British command of the seas at both ends of the Canal effectively prevented enemy vessels from approaching it.

While these instances of closure have no direct bearing upon the present situation, they are interesting for the light they throw on the legal position. It is clear that the freedom of the Canal is guaranteed, subject only to certain minor restrictions upon belligerents and to the reservations regarding the defence of Egyptian territory.

This being the case a legal basis for closing the Canal must be sought elsewhere. It has been suggested that the Council of the League of Nations should, in the hypothetical case mentioned, decide upon the closing of the Canal as a sanction against Italy under Article 16 of the Covenant. Such action naturally presupposes resort to war by Italy "in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15," whereupon "it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League," which undertake to subject it to specified sanctions.

In this case the closing of the Canal would probably be entrusted to Great Britain, as the agent of Egypt, acting with the co-operation of France.

Such a decision having been taken by the League the question arises as to whether the League has the legal right to over-rule international conventions which have been recognised as valid. By certain Articles of the Peace Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon and Lausanne, the validity of the Convention of 1888 has been specifically recognised. To overcome this difficulty it has been suggested that the League Council should decide that the Convention is incompatible with the League Covenant, in that it restricts the liberty of action of the League, and that it should accordingly be abrogated in accordance with Article 20 of the Covenant under which States members agree "that this Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings *inter se* which are inconsistent with the terms thereof. . . ."

But as against this it has been pointed out in the Italian review *Affari Esteri* that the Convention of 1888 has been recognised in two places in the Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties. It is argued, therefore, that a convention which is recognised in two places in the Treaty cannot be abrogated, on the grounds of inconsistency, under an earlier article in the same Treaty. An alternative proposal put forward is that the terms of the Convention of 1888 might be reconsidered under Article 19 of the Covenant, which provides that "The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable. . . ."

1 The Canal is administered by a Company registered in Paris, and subject partly to Egyptian and partly to French Law. Of its 32 Directors, 21 are French, 10 British and one Dutch. The number of shares held by the British Government amounts to 44 per cent of the total.

2 The Signatories of the Convention, with the exception of Spain and the Netherlands.

The Air Armaments Race

AS SEEN THROUGH FRENCH EYES.—2

by HENRI BOUCHÉ

(Continued from Sept. Number)

Decreasing Estimates of the Military Strength of the German Air Force

About a year ago, during a campaign to encourage France to build "thousands of aircraft," Lord Rothermere declared that Hitlerised Germany had at its disposal 25,000 military machines. On May 15, 1935, the same gentleman stated in the House of Lords that Germany had at that time 10,000 bombers, each capable of carrying about a ton of powerful explosives. He added that he had been at considerable pains to establish these facts, and that he made the statement in full realisation of his responsibilities.

But at the beginning of April 1935, Mr. Toukhatchevski, Deputy-Commissioner for War in the U.S.S.R., wrote in the *Pravda* (April 12, 1935): "Twelve air regiments serve in Germany 2100 bombing and fighting aircraft; sixteen regiments, organised by Göring, are stationed at the main strategic points, with war material consisting of 1600 fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. That is a total of 3700 aircraft."

A short time before, however, informing the Aeronautic Commission of the French Chamber (*Le Temps*, November 1934), the Minister of Air stated: "At the beginning of 1934, Germany possessed only a convertible commercial air fleet; not a military one. . . . From the beginning of 1935 she will possess from 1000 to 1100 military aircraft."

Yet, six months later, on May 22, 1935, the British Air Minister, Lord Londonderry, explained to the House of Lords that if the German leaders claimed that they already had 800 or 850 military aircraft they could only justify that figure by counting as such "machines very different" from those which, in England, form the first-line strength. In other words, according to Lord Londonderry, a German military air strength estimated at 800 aircraft is an exaggeration of the facts. We share this opinion.

Can one get still nearer to the truth? Since March to last, the date on which the German Air Minister announced the official formation of a Reich Military Air Force, *two* "Squadrons" have been paraded in public. On March 28 the "Richthofen" Squadron was reviewed by the Chancellor at Döberitz: it turned out with twenty-seven single-seater Arado fighter machines, with B.M.W.-VI. engines (not supercharged), which are certainly incapable of up-to-date performances, and can only represent a transitory type. Later, on April 20, the Chancellor inspected the "Horst Wessel" Squadron, which—according to the photographs—also appears to consist of twenty-seven aircraft: eighteen of Arado type and eight or nine of a somewhat more highly developed type. Quite recently, the Press announced that the Mecklenburg Squadron would be known as the "Immelmann"

The Illustrated London News, Aug. 31, 1935

Squadron, and the Lower Saxony Squadron as the "Bölcke." We do not know whether these groups are already equipped, if not for fighting, at least for military training.

Is the German air strength of to-day limited to four squadrons each of twenty-seven fighter aircraft? Undoubtedly, no. But to what extent has this published strength already been exceeded? Perhaps none knows, save the German leaders themselves, but at least we may, at the moment —as a result of the debates in the British Parliament—consider it as an established fact that the military Air Force of the Reich does not possess 800 machines comparable with those of the British Air Force. In addition, it will be remarked that, so far, none of the military units in Germany possesses multi-seater fighter aircraft such as those with which new armies of the air are equipped. Moreover, a military Air Force, actually organised in squadrons, and endowed with the indispensable training schools and instructional centres, cannot exist without working in the full light of day and in the air; with progressive units equipped; and with staff officers and full personnel. The strength of the German Military Air Force must, therefore, in due time be ranked among established facts.

Are Certain Air Forces More Offensive Than Others?

The strengths of the Air Forces, no matter how difficult and debatable their comparison may be, are, nevertheless, of public interest, for an Air Force is a weapon of attack, aggression, and surprise. It is essential, therefore, for us to know whether, *at the present moment or to-morrow*, any nation possesses, or has the chance of possessing, a huge number of aircraft with which (by being the first to take aggressive action) it could not only start a war, but, by immediate destruction and resultant panic, cause the scales to turn decisively in its favour.

If all aircraft were of equal value, the comparative strengths given in the diagrams would be sufficient to reassure us. But are all aircraft of equal value? And, above all, given an equal number of aircraft, and those aircraft of equal technical value, is it not possible that the *offensive value* of any two Air Forces will differ considerably according to the methods and tactics employed?

We are assured that certain Air Forces—and particularly our own—have not yet acquired that full, free spirit of attack which an "Air Army" must possess: hence the weakness of our fighter squadrons. In other countries, on the contrary, and especially in Italy, the Air Force is said to be "entirely offensive," entirely organised for securing and retaining the "mastery of the air." This is a thesis officially upheld in France last year. Now, on June 1, 1934, the offensive strengths of the great European Air Forces could be compared as follows: France, 426 aircraft, of which 240 were night bombers.—Great Britain, 380 aircraft, of which 80 were night bombers.—Italy, 330 aircraft, of which 110 were night bombers.

In these three countries, however, and especially in Italy and France, there was the question of out-of-date machines whose range and "destructive capacity" were, on the whole, very weak. Accordingly, these "offensive" Air Forces were very mediocre, both in numbers and quality, and sufficiently comparable with each other as regards their weakness to preclude the possibility of their giving anyone cause for anxiety.

This weakness was easy to explain: given the multiplicity of the tasks devolving upon an Air Force, and given a certain level of budgetary estimates, it was impossible for any country to do much better. In order to get away from this mediocrity, which should not have alarmed anyone, since it was general, it was first essential to obtain higher Budget estimates.

The Comparison of Air Budgets

What was each great nation spending on its Air Force before June 1934? How much is it preparing to spend to-morrow? It is worth while to know this, because, the question of immediate armament apart, an increased Budget signifies in the long run "an increased power to wage war." Thus, under a régime of unrestricted national liberty, and in the absence of international control, an Air Force could, in the long run, acquire a dangerous superiority and decide to utilise it for aggression.

Could it acquire this superiority at the expense of the State? Yes; because throughout the world the aircraft industry is still a State industry. We have, therefore, in the nations' Budgets, or in the activities of the States presenting them, a particularly valuable basis on which to found estimates. It is according to the proportion of the public funds it receives that an aircraft industry can develop its equipment, improve its production technique, and *perfect the indispensable mass-production* of very complicated machinery—for example, supercharged engines.

How did the great Air Powers stand in this respect in the middle of 1934? During the last six years, the average annual budget of the United States reached three milliards; France and Great Britain, two milliards; Italy rather less than a milliard; Germany half a milliard from 1929 to 1933 and 1260 millions in 1934.*

Naturally, we cannot conclude from these figures that the technical activities and the aircraft industries are simply proportional to the Budget estimates by which they benefit. We can merely affirm that the Italian Air Force, for example, even if it derives considerable benefit from its country's resources, cannot be stronger than the French or British Air Force, so long as the Italian Budget is less than half as big as those of France or Britain

On the othef hand, money cannot always replace time. For this reason it may be said that the aircraft industry of the Reich, no matter how it may have been encouraged and assisted during the last eighteen months, has not had sufficient time to attain perfection; to launch out into mass-production and turn out speedily such complicated and delicate parts as those from which supercharged engines are made: we know full well that in our own case, just as in England and the United States, years of industrial activity and several milliards of turnover were necessary to establish such factories, set up the equipment, and organise staffs of engineers, foremen, and highly skilled labour; and that even such powerful organisation cannot execute orders as quickly as the General Staffs place them.

* A milliard of francs=10,000,000 pound; taking the franc at 100 to the pound sterling.

(To be continued)

THERE IS ONE WAY OUT:

Saving—Not Spending—Will Bring Reëmployment

By Lewis W. Douglas

I

Never before in the history of this country has there been such a conflict of economic thinking. In all the welter of nostrums, isms, and theories advanced as panaceas for our economic ills, there seems to be only one point on which nearly everyone is in agreement. That point is that the solution to the problem of unemployment is the solution of the depression.

There may be a few people who hope that unemployment will continue, so that continued unrest will later give them an opportunity to impose some new social and economic system upon the country. But, with the exception of this small group, nearly all thinking men and women realize that our millions of unemployed people must be put back to work if we are to achieve economic recovery.

This is the test of all recovery efforts and policies. Obviously no country, no matter what its trade volume, can be said to have achieved recovery with one sixth of its working population unemployed. Conversely, if everyone has a job, the worst features of depression disappear, even though the total trade volume and total income of the country may not be at a peak.

The point on which people disagree so violently is how this objective of reëmployment can best be achieved. The theory enjoying the greatest vogue at the moment is the Spend-Your-Way-Out theory. Proponents of this philosophy tell us that, if everyone will only loosen up and spend a little more, great gains in employment will follow. We are confronted on all sides by slogans, such as 'Spend and Put Men Back to Work,' 'Buy Now and Lick the Depression.' The man who lives well within his income has come to be regarded as unpatriotic and as a slacker in the fight against the depression.

Now this theory of spending till it hurts sounds extremely plausible and logical. If you spend $5.00 more (so the argument runs) instead of saving it, someone has to make the article you purchase. If a million other people each spend $5.00 more, an additional $5,000,000 worth of goods must be produced, and this creates new work for which people must be employed.

It sounds foolproof. A child can see the point. And the argument can be presented in A B C language. So naturally it has become an extremely popular point of view.

The average man, however, although he has perhaps accepted this theory, has been a little puzzled by the sudden fashion in which thrift, which was formerly regarded as a virtue, has now been classified as a vice. He was taught all his life to be thrifty and save, and it is something of a shock to him to discover now that saving is detrimental to public welfare.

Like so many unorthodox economic the-

ories, the Spend-Your-Way-Out theory is only superficially plausible. Its fallacy lies in its failure to recognize two important facts. The first of these is that the great bulk of existing unemployment is in industries which make things that the individual consumer does not buy. The second is that savings do not represent sterile, locked-up funds, but funds which go into immediate circulation through some medium of investment. It might be well to consider the significance of these two facts before we blithely discard the national habit of saving. Perhaps a little sober reflection may even indicate that a dollar of saving can create more employment than a dollar of consumer spending.

II

The frantic exhortation of the public to spend more money is presumably based upon the belief that the consumption of goods by individuals has declined severely, and must be greatly increased if we are to achieve economic recovery. The actual facts do not support that contention.

A study made by the Harvard School of Business, and published in August 1933, presents some very illuminating comparisons for consumption in leading classifications of goods during 1932—which is still the low for the depression—as compared with 1928. This study shows that in 1932 consumption of various classes of goods expressed in percentage of 1928 consumption was as follows: wheat and flour, 90 per cent; butter, 105.6 per cent; silks and velvets, 90.6 per cent; hosiery, 137.6 per cent; popular-priced dresses, 117.7 per cent; infants' wear, 91.4 per cent; cigarettes, 97.8 per cent; gasoline, 113.2 per cent.

There has been, then, during the depression, a relatively constant consumption of goods of the sort purchased by individuals. On the other hand, the consumption of capital goods - that is, durable goods, such as machinery, building materials, and so forth—was found to have declined almost 65 per cent. When consideration is given to the fact that during normal periods the value of capital goods produced in this country every year is approximately equal to the total value of all goods consumed by individuals, the significance of the 65 per cent decline in the output of capital goods becomes apparent. Furthermore, it would seem logical that most of the country's unemployment must be centred in the capital-goods industries. This is the case. For, while employment in industries making goods for individual consumption has declined only 16 per cent, employment in the capital-goods industries has declined more than 50 per cent.

From these facts it becomes apparent that the primary problem is to create reëmployment in the capital-goods industries. Advocates of increased spending believe that this can be done by stimulating consumer purchases. If everyone will buy more clothing, they argue, more machinery and equipment will be needed to produce such additional clothing. The purchase of such equipment will directly increase the volume of business in the capital-goods industries, and will permit such industries, in turn, to employ more people.

Unfortunately it does n't work that way in most cases. Nearly all of the businesses which produce goods for individual consumption can greatly increase their present production without adding to their productive facilities.

This is not merely a theoretical argument; actual experience confirms it. In the spring of 1931, for instance, the Government paid one billion dollars to Veterans in the form of a cash bonus. Immediate increases occurred in the sale of automobiles and other types of consumer goods. But no corresponding increase in the sale of capital goods resulted, nor did the increased consumer spending increase employment in the capital-goods industries. This same failure of increased consumer spending to stimulate demand or employment in the capital-goods industries has again been apparent in the past two years. Aided by forced draft methods, consumer spending has increased. But again no corresponding increase has been felt in the capital-goods industries. Unemployment in such industries continues at almost record levels.

(To be continued)

The Atlantic Monthly, New York, Sept.

A Philosopher Looks at America

By C. E. M. Joad

Author: *Liberty Today*

The first glance confirmed and endorsed all that one had already heard. America, dispassionately considered, the most surprising of countries, contains the fewest surprises. From the moment of arrival there was a disconcerting feeling of familiarity. I had, I felt, met all this before in the books in which English visitors of my sort had recorded their impressions, and in the books of protest and repugnance which Americans had written about themselves. All the familiar stage properties of the critics and the moralists duly appeared on the American stage - the lack of moderation, the worship of machines, the mystical reverence for speed, the continual saving of time by people who, nevertheless, never had time to spare, the recognition of money as the only criterion of worth, the flocks of women at lectures pathetically endeavoring to do the correct thing by "getting right" with culture, the crudity, the enthusiasm, the deafening conversations of simultaneous talkers and no listeners—not one was missing. America I had been taught to regard as the perfect theme for satire. But America cannot be satirized, for the reality outruns and outfaces the satirist. The bookstore which informed me in a moment of confidence that between a third and a quarter of its trade consisted of orders for volumes of specified weights, heights, color and bulk for purposes of interior decoration—it confessed to having done very well since the slump with a special cheap line of dummy books, all backs and covers and no contents—the autograph hunter who approached me after a lecture with a tome of technical metaphysics under her arm, and to my query "wouldn't she find the book, perhaps, a little heavy going?" replied, "Well, I think you ought to know, Mr. Joad, that we don't really read your books. What we want is your autograph, and it happens that this big book of yours exactly fits my color scheme of interior decoration"—these things cannot be satirized; they can only be recorded. Beyond satire too, is the universal distortion of values of a civilization which, while supplying cheap and abundant electric light in those well-warmed rooms in which the English sweat and suffocate, has made of the natural act of sitting undisturbed in converse or silent meditation in the sun an expensive luxury which is beyond the reach of all but the very rich.

But these things, as I say, are stock-in-trade of every literary *Vieux jeu.* They form part of the commentator upon America. Hence, while I confirm, I do not wish to repeat them. But though these familiar strictures faithfully reproduce the basic outlines of the American scene, and reflect the more obvious colorings of the surface picture, they by no means complete it. There is another side to the picture. For, immediately I reflect on my American experiences, memories come crowding in upon me to give the stock generalizations of the English lecturer the lie. America, as its inhabitants are never tired of telling its visitors, is a big country, a continent stretching right across the northern hemisphere - did I not myself move in four days from a temperature twenty-eight degrees below zero at Montreal to one of eighty in the shade at New Orleans? - and no generalization is wide enough to embrace a hemisphere. It is, moreover, still the melting-pot of the races, and what is true of one strand of its many-colored rope of peoples is ludicrously false of another. Thus it is said that Americans cannot rest, and that their civilization is without quiet and serenity. Broadly this is true, yet there was a New England village I visited in Maine which, with its central green, its great old trees clustering round its little white church, looked for all the world like a village in my own country before the cars had found and transformed it. It was, I was told, one of a hundred like it. It is said that money is accepted as the main, if not the sole, criterion of social value, and that men seek to acquire dollars as the sign of prowess in the battle of life, the only one which their community would be prepared to recognize and honor. Yet in New Orleans I met a jolly little chattering woman who was to be seen everywhere in the best society of the place, at parties, dinners, expeditions, races, and worked for a few dollars a week in an antique shop. She belonged, I was told, to an old family which had lost all its money, but the open avowal of the fact seemed no more to incommode her than it prevented her well-to-do friends from making her one of the most popular personalities in the city.

The Sinister Beauty and Arrogance of New York . . .

American cities, it is said, are very ugly. Concerned to perfect the means for the good life, Americans have no concern for the good life itself, for which they have so elaborately prepared; for beauty, for example, and for the part played by beauty of environment in moulding the soul of man. And even as I hasten to endorse the judgment, I remember the Lake Front of Chicago. New York is, I think, a beautiful city, but its beauty is widely recognized. Also it is in some respects a sinister beauty, a monument to the pride and power of man. It is touched with a certain arrog-

ance. "This world," it seems to say, "is the only world, and steel, speed and efficiency are its gods."

Such is the spirit of New York, and as it thrusts its lovely towering buildings ever higher into the sky it seems as if it were thrusting away the world of the spirit, lest its solicitations should interfere with the efficient conduct of business. New York does not turn its back upon God; it pushes him away. Whether there in fact be God or not I do not know, but this much at least is borne in upon the visiting stranger, that, if God there be, there is no place in the world which thrusts him so far away as New York. Those towering, glittering edifices are altogether too self-assured. It is almost as if a lot of little boys had been "cocking snooks" at the Almighty. . . .

For the beauty of the Lake Front at Chicago I was wholly unprepared. It is not merely that it is formal, spacious, shapely. It is not even that the University, the Libraries, the Schools of Art, Science, Industry and Technology form a noble array of buildings, finely planned and laid out on a scale of magnificent amplitude; it is not even that the view of the city from the grounds of the Stadium reveals a skyline as imposing as and more impressive, because less crowded, than that of New York. More important than any of these things, which one has, after all, a right to expect from one of the world's greatest cities, is the fact that some of the individual buildings are in themselves beautiful. The Planetarium is shapely and well-proportioned, the Stadium impresses by its sheer size, but the Aquarium, perfectly proportioned and exhibiting a beauty of line whose significance is inescapable, is a miracle of loveliness. Driving along the Front, past the colored vistas of the World's Fair, the visitor gets an impression of architectural spaciousness enriched by occasional buildings of simple beauty, the total impression of which engenders an excited delight that I have felt in few of the world's cities. I have felt it in Paris, driving up the Champs Elysees to the Arc de Triomphe. I have felt it in Leningrad sailing up the Neva under the perpetual sunset of the white nights of summer through the long avenue of eighteenth-century palaces. I have not felt it in London. . . . Many of the buildings of Chicago seem to have taken those of Ancient Greece as their model; nor do they always disgrace their originals.

The New and Vital Art of America . . .

New Orleans, too, rebukes the stock generalizations of the American lecturer. For that city of the south seemed as different as it could well be from what I had seen in the North or the Middle West. It was not, I should say, a highly cultivated city, but it knew something of the arts of life. Its inhabitants refused to immolate themselves entirely on the altar of money-making. They were not always taking thought for the morrow, nor did they spend their lives continually training for a race that is never run. On the contrary, they ate, drank, sunned themselves, and made love with the same easy acceptance of the good things of life that graces the Italians and the southern French. In New Orleans, too, there is visual beauty and the happy recognition of beauty by a leisurely people, not too busy getting the means to make life possible to spare time and thought for living. Old houses of mellowed brick with their pillars and spacious porticoes, palm trees, blossoming shrubs and the wide green spaces of the public parks help to make New Orleans one of the most visually attractive cities of the world, as the ready hospitality of its people make it one of the pleasantest for the visiting stranger.

Here, too, are poets and artists following the great tradition of those who cultivate the Beautiful and the True with the carefree abandon of poets and artists all the world over. (I was, however, distressed to learn that one of the most successful of the former, perhaps the best-known poet in America, had sold only a hundred and fifty copies of his latest, and, so I was assured, most important book.) Here, too, are novelists not slavishly following European models, but carving out for themselves a new tradition for the novel, and though I am personally too old and sunk in the traditions of the past to appreciate the calculated crudities, the deliberate primitiveness, of a Faulkner or a Hemingway, I recognize that with them a new force has come into the field of literature. And here let me say that there seemed to me to be in contemporary America a really new and vital art. Let us suppose that knowing nothing of American literature one were to ask oneself the question, "what sort of thing is this civilization, young and crude, vigorous and bustling and energetic, likely to produce in the way of imaginative art, assuming that it were to produce anything at all?" And the answer, I think, would be "it would, with luck, produce a robust literature in which figures of a stark simplicity, larger than life size as the figures of an Aeschylean tragedy are larger, are moved by elemental passions to apparently predestined ends." We are all puppets, it seems, twitched into love and war by an invisible showman who pulls the strings. Such was the teaching of the tragedy of the Greeks, and the note recurs in the works of such writers as Dreiser and Hemingway and Faulkner. In these works the simplicity of the thought, the energy of the thinkers, recall almost inevitably the characters of Homer and Aeschylus. To read them after reading the novels of Henry James is to enter a different world, a world which for good or evil is symptomatic of what is and what is coming, as his world is a fading memory of what has been and is gone.

America Still Possesses the Pioneer Virtues . . .

I come finally to the question of moral virtue. I know that there is in America no tradition of disinterested public service, that men enter politics not for the sake of what they can do for the community, but for the sake of what they can get out of the community, that bribery is the key to advancement, that robbery and murder stalk abroad the cities. . . . Nevertheless, I think that the Americans are in the strict sense of the word a good people. I do not mean merely that they are sexually continent, or that they sedulously attend places of worship, or that they pride themselves on their reputation for virtue. On the contrary, they seem to me to be sexually neither better nor worse than their neighbors, to stay away from Church in ever-increasing numbers, and to have produced a younger generation whose main concern is not to let you leave their cocktail parties without first assuring you of their viciousness. My main contention, nevertheless, remains unchanged, and it is time that I sought to implement it. I must illustrate it, first, by what I fear is a platitude. The platitude consists simply in affirming the obvious fact that Americans, in many respects past the pioneering stage, still possess the pioneer virtues. What are these? —Generosity, hospitality, geniality, sociability, general willingness to help, a readiness to welcome the stranger and an anxiety to make him feel at home. These virtues are, no doubt, elementary. They are, as I say, preeminently the virtues of pioneers. Yet they are singularly lacking from the make-up of most Europeans today, who honor them for the most part only with their lips.

For example, when an Englishman tells me "I am delighted to see you. I hope you have had a pleasant voyage," I regard his words merely as a series of conventional noises, a way of getting on terms, of endeavoring to put himself at ease with me, as two dogs meeting will smell one another to find out whether they belong to the same type and species. But when Americans said precisely the same thing I found out that they *really* were delighted, that the assurance that their hope was fulfilled *really* gave them satisfaction. A European will say to a stranger: "You must come and see me sometime. Meanwhile, is there anything I can do to help you?" The stranger, if he is wise, will refrain from taking him at his word. But an American acquaintance would not only express the wish that I should come and see him, he would insist upon my gratifying it, and, in order that there should be no possibility of mischance, would send his car to fetch me, and on the rare occasions when he let me go back, would send it to take me back again.

Similarly with the European's pious hope that he may help or be of service to the stranger. Now the American really *does* help; he *is* of service. He will look out trains for you, see that you catch them, take pains to instruct you in his complex railway system, tell you where to shop, where to feed, deal on your behalf with his own formidable and frequently impolite officials (who always, by the way, assume that you are a crook, swindler, liar and cheat, who is only to be prevented from imposing upon them by the exercise of the utmost vigilance and most ruthless demean on their part), post your letters, send your telegrams, arrange for you to meet the people you want to meet, give parties in your honor, see that you play the games you want to play, and lend you clothes to play them in. Now the cumulative effect of all this is very strong!

American Conversation is Dull but Kindly . . .

Secondly, Americans seem to me to be in a surprising degree charitable and kindly in their attitude to each other. They think well of one another whenever they can, and speak well, even when they must speak better than they think. This charitableness of conversation is rendered easier

by their comparative lack of wit. It is easy to be witty, if you consent to be malicious; hard to make righteousness readable, or even hearable. American conversation is as a result often dull, but it is almost invariably kindly. It apparently gives Americans no pleasure to say amusingly derogatory things about their friends behind their backs, and I found, much to my surprise, that one of the reasons why they did not say them was that they apparently did not think them.

"So and so is a lovely person," I would be told. Or "You must meet Mrs. X. She's simply swell!" Or again, "Mr. Y," who has done this, that or the other, "is one of our finest men." As the increasing difficulty of hearing of any American who was not "lovely," "swell" or "fine" was borne in upon me, I was inclined to write all this off as mere "gush." Cloyed with the sugar of these excessive praisings, I longed for a little astringent criticism. It was only towards the end of my stay that I realized that this was not "gush" (or not always). It was not hypocrisy that made Americans desirous of giving the impression of liking and admiring each other; they really did like and admire each other. I was forced to conclude that though their standards of criticism might be low, the native kindliness of Americans is high. They are, it seems, instinctively well disposed to each other. This is especially true of women. In Europe every woman is every other woman's instinctive enemy. In America women band together in clubs, and crowd happily to lectures, and, so far as I can see, they do not automatically and inevitably grudge, backbite and envy one another. They actually seem to like each other. Now, of what other people is this true?

American Interest in Public Affairs . . .

America at the moment is swayed by an unprecedented interest in public affairs; and the interest is not limited to those of America. America, in fact, is ceasing for the first time to be a political parish. Some recognition of the outer world there has, of course, always been. The leading New York and Boston papers have for years past contained more foreign news than those of any other country, while the American monthlies with their serious and well-informed articles have habitually commanded a circulation which would make the editor of the average English monthly green with envy.

But President Roosevelt's "New Deal" has stimulated *every* class to a new interest in affairs. It has also, and apparently for the first time, imbued a new class of men with the desire to take a hand in them. It was Miss Perkins, the Secretary of the Department of Labor, who spoke in my hearing of a number of young men representing the best brains of their Universities who had during the last eighteen months taken posts in the Government service at ridiculously low salaries, in preference to going into business. Their avowed object was the elimination of graft and corruption from the administration of affairs and the establishment of a disinterested public service. So exalted were their conceptions of public integrity, so rigid their principles of administration, that they had been nicknamed the "early Christians." "And," said Miss Perkins, mock-regretfully, "I frequently find that I am prevented from doing things that I want to do because my early Christians won't let me." Here then, at last, born of public stress and economic collapse, is the germ of a skilled and disinterested public administration which the President is doing his best to foster.

The Modern Thinker

編輯室から

國際聯盟の決議や勸告に對して少しも耳を藉す事のなかつたムツソリニイが、英國海軍のデモンストレーションの前に稍たじろぎを示し來つた事は、伊エ兩國紛爭のたどるべき道を暗示して居るかに見える。三十萬の兵を既に動員して居る手前と、今迄再三再四聯盟の提言を馬耳東風と聞き流した手前約四十年前伊太利軍がアドワでエチオピア軍のために一敗地にまみれて居る手前、振りあげた拳を其儘に引込む事は出來なからうが、さりとて英國海軍の强壓を知らん顏にアフリカ政策を强行する事も難しからうし、外に英國を宗主とする聯盟の制裁の可能性と、內に財政的破綻を控へて、ムツソリニイ首相此處思案の投首と云ふ所であらう。然し乍らアドワの恥を如何せん一で、伊軍がアドワまで進出して敗戰の恥をすゝぐと同時に今後の交涉のための有利なる立場を獲得せんとするのではなからうか。英國の强硬政策にして今後もよく伊國を抑へ得んか、老大帝國イギリスの國際的地位は千鈞の重みを加へるであらう。卷頭の文エ國の對伊戰軍略を說明せるものは萬一開戰の場合に興味があると思ふ。其次の記事は、對伊制裁の場合スエズ運河は國際法上如何なる位置を持つか、合法的に閉鎖され得るか、を檢討したもので、一八八八年に締結された「スエズ運河の自由航行に關する條約」を引用し、且つ從來の事例を例證してよく問題の大體を盡して居ると思ふ。

先月號から連載してある「フランス人の眼を通して見た航空軍備競爭」は今月號ではドイツ空軍の事を述べて後、各國空軍の戰鬪力比較の問題が只だ單に航空機の數に依つた丈では不完全で機の新舊、各國空軍の用ひんとする戰法及び今明日の空軍を豫約する空軍豫算等の要素を考慮に入れるべき事を論じて居る。來月號で完結の筈。

「不況唯一の逃げ道」の著者ドウグラス敎授は目下米國經濟學者中有數の士、米國の繁榮策は「費消に非ず、節約こそ失業をなくする道」なりとの、行文簡潔にして、明快樂しんで讀める文字である。

其次の「一哲學者の米國觀」は勿論題は雜誌社のつけたものであるが、著者は英國哲學界の耆宿とし、平明なる筆の中に穩かなる公平さを示して暗示する所が多い。些細な點乍ら曩きにドイツの批評家エミール・ルードウイツヒが米國のスカイスクレーパーに對して多くの美を見出し特にシカゴの湖邊のスカイラインを甚だしく美しいものとした點は兩者相通ずるものがある。最も注意を引くのは、米國文化の解剖に當つてゼネラリゼーシオンの危險を繰返し强調せる點である。蓋し極めて概括的にして而かも極めて相異れるものを有つて居るのは米國の眞の姿であらう。

出版部發行の書物が續々國の內外で好評を受けつゝある。讀者諸氏と慶を分つべく別刷附錄として御目にかける事とした。此の他なほ我々の一向に讀み得ない スカンヂナビア語やフインランド語などがあるが、轉載を見合せて置いた。

〔第三種郵便物認可〕昭和十年十月一日發行（發行兼印刷人 中土義敬 發行所 振替東京一六〇二四番 北星堂（電話九二四一番）送料五厘）